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 Restoring Chevron’s Domain 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
For some three decades, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.1 has stood at the center of administrative law.2  Although 
Chevron may have been somewhat “accidental,”3 Chevron has been among 
the most important and consequential administrative law decisions of all 
time.4  It is, according to Cass Sunstein, a “foundational, even a quasi-
constitutional text” in administrative law.5 
Foundational or not, Chevron’s domain6 is under siege.7  In recent years, 
commentators have raised doubts about the doctrine’s continued vitality8 and 
 
* Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business 
Law and Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  This Article 
is based upon remarks delivered at the 2016 Missouri Law Review Symposium, A 
Future Without the Administrative State?, which occurred on March 3, 2016.  The 
author thanks Adam Parker-Lavine for research assistance.  All errors or inanities are 
the fault of the author. 
 1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Poli-
cy?  An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (iden-
tifying Chevron as the most cited “modern public law” decision). 
 3. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental 
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).  
See also infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 4. See Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1867, 1872 (2015) (noting Chevron is “the Supreme Court’s most important 
decision regarding judicial deference to agency views of statutory meaning”). 
 5. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006). 
 6. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833 (2001). 
 7. See Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake of Chevron’s Retreat 5 (2016) (un-
published manuscript), http://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Sharkey_In-the-Wake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf (“King v. 
Burwell and Michigan v. EPA – decided within the same momentous week in June 
2015 – taken together, seem to augur the Supreme Court’s retreat from the venerable 
Chevron.”). 
 8. See, e.g., Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infan-
cy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (reporting on Chevron’s demise); see 
also Herz, supra note 4, at 1868 (observing that three decisions during the Supreme 
Court’s 2014–15 Term “suggested that Chevron’s condition was, if not terminal, at 
least serious”); Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 65 
(2015) (noting a recent “series of opinions . . . that call Chevron’s future into ques-
tion”). 
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ultimate desirability.9  Indeed, some have suggested Chevron should be 
ditched altogether10 – if not by the courts, then perhaps by Congress.11 
This brief Article’s aim is not so ambitious as to praise or bury Chevron.  
It seeks only to make a more modest point about the Chevron doctrine and its 
domain.12  On the assumption that Chevron, in some form, will remain a sig-
nificant part of the constellation of administrative law, this Article suggests 
Chevron’s domain should be defined and delimited by its doctrinal ground-
ing.  Put another way, the legal rationale for providing deference to agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory text should determine the doctrine’s 
 
 9. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“‘[T]he judicial power, as originally understood, requires a court to exercise its inde-
pendent judgment in interpreting and expounding upon the laws.’. . . Chevron defer-
ence precludes judges from exercising that judgment . . . . It thus wrests from Courts 
the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is . . . .’” (alterations in orig-
inal) (first quoting Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring); then quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))); 
Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 
708 (2007) (“That inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s ‘interpretation of 
the statute’ is not an adequate substitute for the arbitrary and capricious review that 
the APA requires.”); Patrick J. Smith, Chevron’s Conflict with the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 813, 814 (2013) (“Chevron also ignored the provi-
sion in section 706 of the APA requiring that, when a court reviews agency action, 
‘the reviewing court shall . . . interpret . . . statutory provisions.’”) (alterations in orig-
inal).  Some raised concerns about Chevron earlier.  Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism 
and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 353–54 (1994) (“A 
less . . . fundamental problem is that Chevron is based on a model of courts as faithful 
agents – faithful agents first of the legislature, but when no instructions from the leg-
islature can be discerned, then faithful agents of administrative decisionmakers.”). 
 10. See Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chev-
ron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 
850–51 (2010) (“Chevron is inconsistent with the APA, has not accomplished its 
apparent goals of simplifying judicial review and increasing deference to agencies, 
and has instead spawned an incredibly complicated regime that serves only to waste 
litigant and judicial resources.”); Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1187, 1227–37 (2016) (raising constitutional concerns about Chevron defer-
ence); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014). 
 11. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 4768, 114th Cong. (2016) 
(this legislation would, among other things, overturn the Chevron doctrine).  For a 
discussion of this legislation, see Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016: 
Hearing on H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and 
Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016); Christopher J. 
Walker, Opinion, Courts Regulating the Regulators, U. PENN. L. SCH.: REGBLOG 
(Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.regblog.org/2016/04/25/walker-courts-regulating-the-
regulators/. 
 12. On the notion of Chevron’s domain generally, see Merrill & Hickman, supra 
note 6. 
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scope and application.13  More precisely, insofar as the Court’s subsequent 
application and elucidation of Chevron have indicated that Chevron deference 
is predicated on a theory of delegation, courts should only provide such def-
erence when the relevant power has been delegated by Congress (even if such 
delegation is only implicit).  Correspondingly, such deference should be 
withheld when such delegation is absent or cannot be presumed to have oc-
curred.  Chevron should only prevail when confined to its proper domain, and 
its domain is a product of delegation. 
I.  THE ACCIDENTAL LANDMARK 
Chevron’s two-part test is quite familiar: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines 
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the 
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as 
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute.14 
This test has become a fixture of administrative law.  Whether or not the 
Court’s description describes what lower courts actually do in practice,15 
lower courts rely upon Chevron quite often.16  Each year federal appellate 
courts cite Chevron in over 200 cases.17  But although Chevron is ubiquitous, 
its place in the pantheon of great administrative law cases requires some ex-
 
 13. See id. at 836 (“The conclusion that Chevron rests on an implied delegation 
from Congress . . . has important implications for Chevron’s domain . . . .”). 
 14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (footnotes omitted). 
 15. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only 
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing a Chevron analysis only requires one 
step). 
 16. See Kent H. Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 
115 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2808848. 
 17. Westlaw indicates that, between 2011 and 2015, Chevron has been cited by 
federal appellate courts approximately 230 times per year.  Citing References for 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
WESTLAW, www.next.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2016). 
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planation.  When it was first decided, few recognized its significance.18  The 
Justices seemed unaware they were erecting a substantial edifice.19  There is 
no indication that Chevron’s author, Justice John Paul Stevens, sought to 
break new ground, let alone define the contours of judicial review of adminis-
trative agency statutory interpretations for years to come. 
Chevron’s significance grew over time as judges on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the Executive Branch deployed Chevron’s 
famous test to blunt judicial review and carve out greater freedom for admin-
istrative action.20  The Reagan and Bush Administrations, in particular, saw 
Chevron as a way to facilitate greater executive control over regulatory poli-
cy.21 
Justice Stevens’s ambitions while drafting Chevron may have been 
modest, but the effects of his decision have been quite expansive.  Given the 
breadth of delegation in the modern administrative state, granting deference 
to agency interpretations of the statutes they implement augments the scope 
of agency power.  Congress enacts lengthy statutes laden with gaps and am-
biguities conferring broad regulatory authority to federal agencies, which, in 
turn, are granted the responsibility and authority to offer conclusive interpre-
tations of what these statutes mean.22  Although courts are not supposed to 
consider agency views in the threshold inquiry,23 this is a limitation honored 
in the breach.24 
 
 18. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 402 (“But Chevron was little noticed when it 
was decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some years later.”). 
 19. See id. at 417; see also Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Su-
preme Court: Highlights from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10637, 10644 
(2005). 
 20. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 422. 
 21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Defer-
ence: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1087 (2008) (“Almost immediately, Reagan Administra-
tion officials and appointees proclaimed a ‘Chevron Revolution.’”); Merrill, supra 
note 3, at 424 (“The Democratic judges were likely somewhat hostile to the deregula-
tory initiatives of the Reagan Administration, and would seek some way to strike 
them down. . . . The newly-appointed Republican judges, in contrast . . . would be 
eager to find some way to uphold these initiatives.  Perhaps these Republican judges 
seized upon Chevron as the most effective weapon at hand for upholding controver-
sial administrative decisions.”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372–80 (2001) (discussing how Chevron can and should 
facilitate greater White House control of agencies). 
 22. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41472, RULEMAKING 
REQUIREMENTS AND AUTHORITIES IN THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 4 (2010) (“CRS searches of the Dodd-Frank Act identi-
fied a total of 330 provisions that expressly indicated in the text that rulemaking is 
required or permitted.  For a variety of reasons, however, the number of final rules 
that will be ultimately issued pursuant to the act is unknowable.”). 
 23. See Am. Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The first 
question, whether there is such an ambiguity, is for the court, and we owe the agency 
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In offering their interpretations, agencies not only resolve ambiguities, 
they exercise policy judgment about how regulatory regimes should be im-
plemented and enforced.  This means, in practice, Chevron deference does 
not merely concern the semantic meaning of statutes.  It extends to policy 
choice as well.25  If agency interpretations of ambiguous or incomplete statu-
tory texts are to be given conclusive effect, as Chevron seems to require, fed-
eral agencies have more room to direct federal regulatory policy. 
II.  GROUNDING CHEVRON 
Whether due to its accidental provenance or not, Chevron was not par-
ticularly well grounded at its inception.  The opinion itself was conceived as 
an application of well-settled practice26 and offered multiple potential expla-
nations for conferring deference to agency interpretations.  Accordingly, there 
has been much debate about how to understand Chevron’s rationale.27 
One justification for giving deference to agency interpretations of stat-
utes they implement is comparative institutional competence.28  Agencies, as 
institutions, may possess a comparative advantage at interpreting the meaning 
of statutory provisions they implement.  Agency officials are likely to be far 
more familiar with the particulars of a given statutory regime, the subjects to 
which the statute applies, and how different interpretations or applications 
may advance (or frustrate) the legislature’s purposes than are judges (or even 
 
no deference on the existence of ambiguity.”); see also Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. 
Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc), amended, 38 F.3d 
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct 1863, 1877 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“An agency cannot exercise interpretive authority 
until it has it; . . . whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, 
without deference to the agency.”). 
 24. If agency expertise is a justification for Chevron deference, and, as Christo-
pher Walker has demonstrated, agencies participate in legislative drafting, see Chris-
topher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999, 1037 
(2015) (“[N]early eight in ten [federal agencies] (78%) indicated that their agency 
always or often participates in a technical drafting role for the statutes it administers . 
. . .”), some suggest courts should consider agency views when determining whether a 
statute is ambiguous.  Sharkey, supra note 7, at 29–31 (discussing implications of 
agency participation in legislative drafting). 
 25. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 
(1984) (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies 
that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it un-
less it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not 
one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 
U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961))). 
 26. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512–13 (noting that “courts have been content to accept 
‘reasonable’ executive interpretations of law for some time”). 
 27. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 21, at 1088. 
 28. Id. at 1147. 
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legislators).  Indeed, agency officials may be responsible for portions of the 
relevant statutory text.29 
Another justification is political accountability.30  Agency officials are 
subject to presidential appointment and (at least outside of independent agen-
cies) presidential removal as well.31  The most significant and substantial 
agency actions, such as the promulgation of economically significant regula-
tions, are subject to White House review through the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs.32  Insofar as adopting a particular statutory interpreta-
tion entails some degree of policy judgment, agency officials are likely to 
adopt those statutory interpretations that are consistent with the reigning ad-
ministration’s policy preferences. 
Agencies are not only more accountable than judges, they may also have 
a greater understanding of legislative intent and purposes.  Agency officials 
may have played a role in the drafting process.  At the same time, they are 
likely to be cognizant of legislative preferences when implementing and in-
terpreting statutory provisions.  When agencies go astray, members of Con-
gress may intervene.  Legislative oversight and control over the appropria-
tions process discipline agency action, at least on the margin. 
The combination of executive and legislative pressures ensures that 
agency interpretations will be responsive to political concerns.  Judges, on the 
other hand, are more insulated from such political pressures.  This, combined 
with the relative lack of expertise among the judiciary, means that judicial 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, while perhaps more seman-
tically satisfying, will be less responsive to political forces, and the judges 
themselves will be largely unaccountable for their decisions. 
 
 29. See Walker, supra note 24, at 1037 (“[N]early four in five rule drafters re-
ported that their agencies always or often participate in a technical drafting role of 
statutes they administer, whereas three in five indicated that their agencies similarly 
participate in a policy or substantive drafting role.”). 
 30. Id. at 1064.  See also Yehonatan Givati & Matthew C. Stephenson, Judicial 
Deference to Inconsistent Agency Statutory Interpretations, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 91 
(2011) (“Many of these scholars conclude that the need for agencies to respond flexi-
bly to changing circumstances militates in favor of deferring just as much to revised 
agency interpretations as to initial agency interpretations . . . . A powerful additional 
argument for this position invokes the importance of political accountability: changes 
in an agency’s interpretive position may reflect changes in the agency’s political pri-
orities – often triggered by a change in the presidential administration . . . .”). 
 31. See Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in 
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2544 (2011) (under the 
reasoning of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 
U.S. 477 (2010), “agency independence is unconstitutional because it insulates the 
heads of independent agencies from the President’s removal power and consequently 
contravenes the constitutional structure that vests the executive power and accounta-
bility for the executive branch in the President”). 
 32. See Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of 
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1075–76 (1986). 
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Empowering agencies to offer authoritative interpretations of ambiguous 
federal laws also serves the goal of uniformity within the federal system.33  If 
federal law is federal law, it should apply uniformly throughout the nation.  
Leaving the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes to the courts can 
result in different interpretations applying in different places (at least until the 
Supreme Court resolves such questions, should it choose to do so).  A federal 
agency interpretation to which courts are obliged to defer, on the other hand, 
provides for a single nationwide interpretation of the relevant statute. 
Expertise, accountability, and uniformity are all policy reasons for defer-
ring to agencies over judges in the interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
phrases.  They are reasons why Congress might prefer to confer interpretive 
authority to agencies over courts.  Legislators may also conclude that agen-
cies are more faithful (or more controllable) agents than courts.  But whatever 
the merits of such arguments, they do not provide a legal basis for Chevron. 
The above are reasons why Congress might choose to enact a deference 
regime, but they are not evidence that Congress has actually done so.  Indeed, 
there is little evidence that Congress has adopted such a generalized presump-
tion that agencies are due deference in their interpretations.34  To the contrary, 
the plain text of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) would seem to 
suggest just the opposite.  Section 706 of the APA provides that courts are to 
“decide all relevant questions of law,” including the meaning of “statutory 
provisions.”35  This would seem to preclude a blanket doctrine of ceding in-
terpretive primacy to administrative agencies.  After all, the semantic mean-
 
 33. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 861 (“[I]f we insist that courts al-
ways have the final say about the meaning of federal statutes, the increasingly com-
mon result will be that federal law will come to mean different things in different 
circuits.  Other than the Supreme Court, the only entities with the power to adopt 
nationally uniform interpretations are the federal administrative agencies.  Conse-
quently, if uniformity cannot be achieved by pushing interpretational conflicts up to 
the Supreme Court, it may be necessary to resolve these conflicts by pushing them 
down to the agency level.”); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: 
Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of 
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1121 (1987) (“When national uniformity in 
the administration of national statutes is called for, the national agencies responsible 
for that administration can be expected to reach single readings of the statutes for 
which they are responsible and to enforce those readings within their own frame-
work.”). 
 34. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside – An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Can-
ons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 995–96 (2013) (reporting legislative drafters sur-
veyed “realize[d] that courts use ambiguity as a signal of delegation” but this “does 
not mean that they intend to delegate whenever ambiguity remains in finalized statu-
tory language”). 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (“To the extent necessary to decision and when pre-
sented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the 
terms of an agency action.”). 
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ing of a given statutory provision is precisely the sort of legal question the 
APA assigns to the courts. 
Although others have suggested that Chevron has a constitutional36 or 
common law37 foundation, the Court has made clear that Chevron is, in fact, 
premised on a delegation of interpretive and policymaking authority from 
Congress to implementing agencies.38  There is no statutory provision, in the 
APA or elsewhere, instructing courts to defer to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous statutory texts.  Nonetheless, Chevron deference rests on a pre-
sumption that such delegation has in fact occurred.39  As Chief Justice Rob-
erts explained in King v. Burwell, Chevron “is premised on the theory that a 
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the 
agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”40 
The delegation foundation of Chevron does have constitutional roots.  It 
is a function of the initial and exclusive allocation of legislative authority to 
the Congress in Article I.41  As a consequence, administrative agencies have 
no inherent power.42  Federal agencies only have that authority and power 
that Congress delegates to them.43  A federal agency’s power to interpret stat-
utory language – and, in the process, to define the contours of legal rights and  
 36. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and 
the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 286 (1988) (“[T]he 
importance of judicial deference to administrative action is derived from the separa-
tion of powers.  Recognizing this cannot truly be said to slight the appropriate role of 
the court to ‘say what the law is.’”); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the 
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 283 (1986). 
 37. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 
618–19 (1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Ad-
ministrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 345–54 (2000). 
 38. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (“A precon-
dition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative 
authority.”). 
 39. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 6, at 836 (“Chevron rests on implied 
congressional intent.”); id. at 855 (“A finding that there has been an appropriate con-
gressional delegation of power to the agency is critical under Chevron.”). 
 40. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000), superseded by statute, 
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 387–387u (West 
2016)); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) 
(“A premise of Chevron is that when Congress grants an agency the authority to ad-
minister a statute by issuing regulations with the force of law, it presumes the agency 
will use that authority to resolve ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”). 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested 
in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). 
 42. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is 
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations 
is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”). 
 43. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency 
literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
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obligations under federal law – only extends as far as it has been delegated by 
the legislature in a validly enacted statute.44  If an agency is to exercise inter-
pretive authority and control how a federal law is to be interpreted and ap-
plied in federal court, that power must come from Congress.  The policy 
judgment that certain policy questions may be resolved by administrative 
action is for Congress to make. 
Although Congress must delegate interpretive authority to agencies, few 
statutes expressly provide for such delegation.  That Congress intends each 
ambiguity as a delegation of authority may be a “legal fiction.”45  There is 
evidence that legislative staff are aware of Chevron and consider its applica-
tion when drafting legislative language.46  Nonetheless, there is good reason 
to doubt that members of Congress have the specific intent to delegate con-
clusive interpretive authority to federal agencies in each and every legislative 
enactment that does not specify otherwise.47  Indeed, legislative drafters may 
not even be aware of the latent ambiguities that reside in their handiwork.  
Regardless, this legal fiction provides Chevron’s legal foundation. 
Subsequent Court opinions have made clear that Chevron’s foundation 
rests on a theory of delegation.48  Mead, in particular, adopts a delegation 
theory of Chevron deference.49  Since the passing of Mead’s lone dissenter, 
nothing has changed.50  Once again, the delegation theory of Chevron was 
reaffirmed at the close of the last Term in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navar-
ro, in which the Court unanimously reaffirmed the need for agencies to ex-
plain the basis for their statutory interpretations.51 
 
 44. Id. at 358. 
 45. See Herz, supra note 4, at 1876 (“[I]t is hard to find anyone who does not 
consider congressional delegation a fiction.”); Lisa Schulz Bressman, Reclaiming the 
Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2011) (noting 
Chevron “rests on a legal fiction”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: 
Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 749 (2002) (“Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a 
congressional delegation . . . .”). 
 46. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 34, at 901. 
 47. Krotoszynski, supra note 45, at 742. 
 48. See Gluck, supra note 8, at 94–96. 
 49. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  As Eskridge 
and Baer observe, “Mead appears to have partially settled the debate within the Court 
about the conditions for triggering Chevron deference.”  Eskridge & Baer, supra note 
21, at 1123. 
 50. Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter in Mead.  See Mead, 533 U.S at 239 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 51. 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“Chevron deference is not warranted where 
the regulation is ‘procedurally defective’ – that is, where the agency errs by failing to 
follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation.” (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 
227)).  Although Justice Thomas and Justice Alito dissented, they agreed with the 
majority on this point.  See id. at 2129 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the 
majority’s conclusion that we owe no Chevron deference to the Department’s position 
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The Court’s holding that Chevron deference requires legislative delega-
tion of the authority to make a conclusive policy judgment and that an agency 
must have arrived at its statutory interpretation in the course of exercising 
such power are necessary corollaries of a delegation theory of Chevron.52  
While the Supreme Court has grounded Chevron deference in a theory of 
delegation, it has inconsistently embraced the consequences of such a concep-
tion of Chevron in subsequent cases.53 
III.  CONSEQUENCES 
The theoretical grounding of a doctrine should shape how that doctrine 
is applied.  Chevron’s foundation, therefore, should define and delimit Chev-
ron’s domain.  If Chevron, properly understood, is grounded in the legisla-
ture’s delegation of authority to administrative agencies, several things 
should follow.  Among them are the following. 
First, ambiguity is not enough to trigger Chevron deference.  As Mead 
indicated, ambiguous statutory language is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for Chevron deference.54  More is required.55  Specifically, there 
must be an indication that Congress has delegated an agency the authority to 
act with the force of law, such as through a notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
and the agency must have exercised such power when putting forth its inter-
pretation.56  This means not only that the agency must have exercised its del-
egated power to promulgate rules or otherwise act with the force of law, but 
that it also fulfilled all of the relevant procedural requirements.57 
 
because ‘deference is not warranted where [a] regulation is “procedurally defec-
tive.”’” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2125 (majority opinion)). 
 52. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (“[A]dministrative implementation of a par-
ticular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the 
exercise of that authority.”). 
 53. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text (discussing City of Arlington 
v. FCC, 133 S. Ct 1863, 1877 (2013)). 
 54. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27. 
 55. See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
existence of statutory ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion 
that Congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill because our 
cases make clear that other, sometimes context-specific, factors will on occasion 
prove relevant.”). 
 56. Mead, 533 U.S. at 240 (“We have recognized a very good indicator of dele-
gation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage 
in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for 
which deference is claimed.”). 
 57. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016). 
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Under Mead, Chevron’s two steps should be preceded by a robust “Step 
Zero.”58  If delegation is the source of an agency’s power to resolve statutory 
ambiguities, then such a delegation of authority must be found before defer-
ence is given.59  An agency interpretation is only eligible for deference if it is 
adopted pursuant to an exercise of delegated power.60  Further, contrary to the 
Court’s opinion in City of Arlington v. FCC, an agency should not – indeed, 
cannot – receive deference on the question of whether such power has been 
delegated.61  Put another way, there should be no deference on matters con-
cerning the existence or scope of an agency’s regulatory jurisdiction.62 
To say that a finding of delegation is a necessary predicate for deference 
does not necessarily mean that any and all such delegations must be explicit.  
Congress drafts statutes with an awareness of Chevron deference but rarely 
makes explicit in statutory provisions its intent to defer.63  As Mead indicates, 
the delegation of authority may be implicit in a given regulatory or adminis-
trative scheme.64  Nonetheless, this delegation must be shown.  Just as Con-
gress cannot be presumed to “hide elephants in mouseholes,”65 delegation 
must be demonstrated, not merely presumed. 
Where it is unlikely or implausible that Congress would have delegated 
interpretive authority to an administrative agency, there should be no Chev-
ron deference.  As the Court has said in various cases – most recently King v. 
Burwell – courts should be reluctant to defer to agencies on questions of ma-
jor economic or political significance.66  It is extremely unlikely that Con-
gress would delegate the responsibility for resolving such questions to admin-
 
 58. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 208 (“If the underlying theory involves implic-
it (and fictional) delegation, the real question is when Congress should be understood 
to have delegated law-interpreting power to an agency.”).  While “Step Zero” ques-
tions are analytically prior to the traditional two-step Chevron inquiry, courts need not 
always proceed through these steps in a chronological sequence.  If the relevant statu-
tory text is sufficiently clear, a reviewing court may not need to consider more. 
 59. As the Chief Justice argued in his City of Arlington dissent, that Congress 
delegated some authority to an agency is insufficient.  See 133 S. Ct. at 1881 (Rob-
erts, C.J., dissenting).  What is required is that Congress delegated authority pursuant 
to the statutory provisions at hand.  Id. 
 60. See Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chev-
ron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1497, 1532–54 (“[T]he no-deference rule is implied by the very nature of administra-
tive agencies – agencies have no inherent powers, and can act only to the extent that 
Congress has delegated them the power to do so.”). 
 61. Id. at 1532. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 34, at 996. 
 64. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). 
 65. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 
 66. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
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istrative agencies.67  Indeed, the delegation of some such questions might 
raise constitutional questions.68 
A delegation theory of Chevron may also preclude deference concerning 
certain types of questions.  It is one thing to presume that Congress has dele-
gated to an agency interpretive authority to resolve a specific ambiguity with-
in a statutory provision that the agency administers.  It is something else to 
defer to an agency when the relevant question is whether a statutory delega-
tion has occurred at all.  As Chief Justice Roberts counseled in City of Arling-
ton: 
A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its 
own, that the agency is entitled to deference.  Courts defer to an agen-
cy’s interpretation of law when and because Congress has conferred 
on the agency interpretive authority over the question at issue.  An 
agency cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the ques-
tion whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a 
court, without deference to the agency.69 
The Chief Justice wrote these words in dissent, but it is not difficult to 
hear their echo in his opinion for the Court in King v. Burwell.  A majority of 
his colleagues may have been unwilling to conclude Chevron does not apply 
to agency interpretations concerning the scope of its own jurisdiction, but a 
majority signed on when he revived the major questions doctrine in King.70 
IV.  BEYOND MAJOR QUESTIONS 
The major questions doctrine is consistent with Chevron, as currently 
conceived, because courts may presume it is unlikely that Congress would 
delegate such matters to regulatory agencies without having made such an 
intention explicit.  As the Court has said on repeated occasions, it does not 
 
 67. Id. at 2489 (availability of tax credits on exchanges established by the federal 
government is “a question of deep economic and political significance that is central 
to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it 
surely would have done so expressly”). 
 68. See Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1539. 
 69. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1877 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dis-
senting). 
 70. See King, 135 S. Ct. 2480; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  As Abbe Gluck notes, the King decision suggests that “not 
every ambiguity in an imperfect and complicated statute creates interpretive space for 
the agency.”  See Gluck, supra note 8, at 96.  Rather, Chevron applies “only for mun-
dane or confined questions that do not implicate the functionality of the overall statu-
tory structure.”  Id.  Of note, however, Justice Kennedy was the only Justice to join 
Chief Justice Roberts in both opinions. 
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lightly presume that Congress has hidden an elephant in a mousehole.71  This 
principle is not limited to questions of major political or economic signifi-
cance, however.72  The magnitude or consequence of a given policy question 
may be such that courts should pause before presuming Congress has dele-
gated the question to the agency, but this is not the only reason for courts to 
pause before presuming such a delegation of authority. 
In some cases, the nature of a statute’s enactment may serve the same 
function as a question of major economic or political significance.  Consider 
King v. Burwell.  As has been extensively documented, the Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”) went through a highly unusual legislative process.73  As the 
Chief Justice noted in his King opinion, the statute was anything but a model 
of careful draftsmanship.74  The use of the reconciliation process to enact a 
statute of this size and scope was unprecedented, and the statute was never 
subject to a House-Senate conference in which the kinks could have been 
ironed out.75  Nor was there a conference report or other document detailing 
the role and operation of each relevant provision. 
In King, the Court suggested that the question of whether tax credits 
were available in states with federally established exchanges was too conse-
quential to leave to the IRS.76  Although unstated, the process through which 
the ACA was enacted could reinforce this conclusion.  Had Congress enacted 
the ACA in a more regular and considered fashion – and not revised and en-
acted in a rush – it might have been reasonable for the Court to conclude that 
Congress had delegated resolution of this question to the IRS, even though 
such a delegation would have left the IRS with the awesome power to deter-
 
 71. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); Gon-
zalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 645 
(2010). 
 72. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483. 
 73. See Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation Without Representa-
tion: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the PPACA, 23 HEALTH 
MATRIX 119, 124–26 (2013); Gluck, supra note 8, at 76–77; Jonathan H. Adler & 
Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective Contextualism, 
2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 35, 42–43. 
 74. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2484; id. at 2492 (“Congress wrote key parts of the Act 
behind closed doors, rather than through the traditional legislative process.  And Con-
gress passed much of the Act using a complicated budgetary procedure known as 
reconciliation, which limited opportunities for debate and amendment, and bypassed 
the Senate’s normal 60-vote filibuster requirement.  As a result, the Act does not 
reflect the type of care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant 
legislation.”) (citations omitted). 
 75. Adler & Cannon, supra note 73, at 125. 
 76. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2483 (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign that question to 
an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.  It is especially unlikely that Con-
gress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in craft-
ing health insurance policy of this sort.”) (citation omitted). 
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mine whether millions of Americans were eligible for tax credits.77  It would 
be one thing to conclude that Congress intended to delegate such power 
where Congress carefully considered the relevant language and its implica-
tions.  It would be quite another thing, however, to believe that Congress had 
delegated authority without ever even hinting as much.  The unusualness of a 
delegation of such magnitude, combined with the way the ACA was enacted, 
both counsel against presuming any such delegation would have been intend-
ed. 
Chevron suggests that a statutory silence – a failure of Congress to ad-
dress a particular question – may provide the sort of ambiguity that consti-
tutes an implicit delegation of authority.78  Justice Stevens’s opinion speaks 
of ambiguities that arise when a statute is “silent” on the relevant question.79  
Whatever the merits of such an argument where Congress has enacted a stat-
ute through the usual process,80 it would seem to have no bearing when a 
statute is not subject to the sort of internal deliberation in which a decision to 
delegate authority to an agency would have been made.  If we are to presume 
that legislators draft statutes in light of Chevron and implicitly delegate inter-
pretive authority in the process, this assumption should be grounded in as-
sumptions about the regularity of the legislative process. 
Where a statute is not simply ambiguous, or even silent, on a matter, but 
“Janus-faced”81 or internally contradictory, there are additional reasons for 
courts to pause before deferring.  The Court faced such a statute in Scialabba 
v. Cuellar de Osorio, in which the relevant statute was self-contradictory but 
failed to recognize the implications of Chevron’s foundation for its applica-
tion in such a case.82 
At issue in Scialabba was a complex question of immigration law: how 
to determine the priority date for visa applications of U.S. citizens’ family 
members and lawful permanent residents who applied for visas as minors but 
“age out” while waiting for their applications to be processed.83  The relevant 
statutes, as amended by the Child Status Protection Act (“CSPA”), were any-
thing but clear, at least as applied to some applicants.  Indeed, as some of the 
 
 77. As came out in oral argument, one consequence of leaving this question to 
the IRS would be that subsequent administrations could reverse this interpretation of 
the relevant statutory provisions. 
 78. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984). 
 79. Id. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute.”). 
 80. For an argument that silences should not be considered such an ambiguity, 
see Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1500–59. 
 81. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality). 
 82. Id. at 2213. 
 83. Id. at 2201.  As Justice Kagan wryly observed, only “hardy readers” could be 
expected to wade through the Court’s opinion, let alone the relevant statutory provi-
sions.  Id. at 2203. 
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Justices concluded, the relevant provision addressed one set of visa applicants 
in “divergent ways.”84  The relevant statutory provisions seemed to conflict 
with one another, forcing the Court to consider whether an intra-statutory 
conflict would constitute (or create) the sort of ambiguity that could trigger 
Chevron deference.85 
On a theory of Chevron grounded in agency expertise and political ac-
countability, the case for deference would be strong.  Insofar as Chevron is 
premised upon delegation, however, such a theory has problems.  It is one 
thing to say that a gap or ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation to fill in 
the details but quite another to (in effect) conclude that when Congress has 
enacted conflicting details, it delegated to the agency the power to choose 
which detail should control.  To so hold is to conclude that Congress has del-
egated to an agency the power to correct Congress’s mistakes.86 
Writing for herself and two others, Justice Kagan had no problem con-
cluding that Chevron should apply.  In her telling, Scialabba was “the kind of 
case Chevron was built for.”87  Given Kagan’s academic work grounding 
Chevron in political accountability and Executive Branch policymaking, this 
is not surprising.88  What may be surprising, however, is that her opinion 
made no effort to reconcile its holding with Mead and effectively side-
stepped the question of whether an intra-statutory conflict should really be 
read as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority.  The “self-
contradictory” nature of the provisions at issue rendered them ambiguous, 
and, in Justice Kagan’s view, that was enough to trigger Chevron deference.89 
 
 84. Id. at 2203–04.  Some of the Justices, however, believed the provisions that 
appeared to be in conflict with one another could be reconciled, obviating the need to 
defer to the agency.  See, e.g., id. at 2214–15 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2216 
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2217 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 86. Cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1043–44 (D.C. Cir. 
2001) (“Lest it ‘obtain a license to rewrite the statute,’ . . . we do not give an agency 
alleging a scrivener’s error the benefit of Chevron step two deference, by which the 
court credits any reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute.  Rather, the agency 
‘may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect congressional in-
tent.’” (quoting Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 
1998))). 
 87. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 88. See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2373 (“As first conceived, the Chevron defer-
ence rule had its deepest roots in a conception of agencies as instruments of the Presi-
dent, entitled to make policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of 
his relationship to the public.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondele-
gation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 213. 
 89. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203 (“[I]nternal tension makes possible alternative 
reasonable constructions, bringing into correspondence in one way or another the 
section’s different parts.  And when that is so, Chevron dictates that a court defer to 
the agency’s choice . . . .”). 
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Chief Justice Roberts, while concurring in the result, refused to endorse 
Justice Kagan’s Chevron revisionism.90  As he wrote for himself (and Justice 
Scalia), he considered Justice Kagan’s “suggest[ion] that deference is war-
ranted because of a direct conflict between [statutory] clauses . . . wrong.”91  
As he explained, under Chevron, “courts defer to an agency’s reasonable 
construction of an ambiguous statute because we presume that Congress in-
tended to assign responsibility to resolve the ambiguity to the agency,” but no 
such assumption can be made where Congress simultaneously enacts conflict-
ing provisions.92  The Chief elaborated: “Direct conflict is not ambiguity, and 
the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory construction but legislative 
choice.  Chevron is not a license for an agency to repair a statute that does not 
make sense.”93 
Justice Kagan only wrote for three members of the Court in Scialabba, 
but the Court may soon be confronted with another case of an intra-statutory 
conflict, albeit one of an even more unusual variety.  Among the many ques-
tions raised in pending legal challenges to the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Clean Power Plan (“CPP”) is how to handle an apparent statutory 
conflict created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.94  When Con-
gress revised the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1990, it enacted two separate 
(and conflicting) revisions to the antecedent statutory provision.95  This is an 
intra-statutory conflict, but it is also something more, for the question is not 
merely what the statute means but what the statute is.  As such, it should pre-
sent an even more unlikely candidate for Chevron deference. 
Here is some background.  The CPP is an effort to control greenhouse 
gas emissions from existing power plants, coal-fired power plants in particu-
lar, under § 111(d) of the CAA.96  Under this provision, the EPA identifies 
the “best system of emission reduction” that has been “adequately demon-
strated” for a given source category.97  This becomes the standard of perfor-
mance that existing sources must meet.  Pursuant to the CAA’s structure of 
 
 90. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. (“[W]hen Congress assigns to an agency the responsibility for deciding 
whether a particular group should get relief, it does not do so by simultaneously say-
ing that the group should and that it should not.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830-01, 34853 (proposed June 18, 2014) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  See Environmental Law – Clean Air Act – EPA 
Interprets the Clean Air Act to Allow Regulation of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from 
Existing Power Plants. – The Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60), 129 HARV. L. REV. 1152 (2016). 
 95. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34830-01, 34853 (proposed June 18, 2014) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
 97. Id. § 7411(a)(1). 
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“cooperative federalism,” states are then expected to develop implementation 
plans under which sources within each state will meet the emission targets.98  
Should states refuse to develop implementation plans, the CAA empowers the 
EPA to impose an implementation plan of its own in order to achieve the 
same level of emission reductions.99 
Whatever its legal merits, the CPP represents the most ambitious effort 
to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions yet attempted.  The plan’s goal 
is to reduce power plant emissions by 32 percent (below 2005 levels) by 
2030.100  This is significant because power plants are responsible for the li-
on’s share of greenhouse gas emissions.101  As such, whether the EPA has 
statutory authority to impose and implement the CPP would seem to represent 
the sort of major question for which Chevron deference is inappropriate.  
Whether and how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to this degree is clearly 
a matter of major economic and political significance, yet there is more. 
Section 111(d) is not so much ambiguous as it is at war with itself.  This 
is because Congress enacted two separate revisions to § 111(d) in two sepa-
rate parts of the CAA Amendments of 1990.  The language currently in the 
U.S. Code says the EPA cannot use § 111(d) to regulate air pollutants that are 
“emitted from a source category” regulated under § 112.102  Because power 
plants are currently subject to regulation under § 112, albeit for the purpose 
of controlling other pollutants, this would suggest that the EPA lacks the au-
 
 98. Id. § 7411(c). 
 99. Id. § 7411(d)(2). 
 100. Overview of the Clean Power Plan: Cutting Carbon Pollutants from Power 
Plants, EPA 2, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-
overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). 
 101. Learn About Carbon Pollution from Power Plants, EPA, 
http://epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/learn-about-carbon-pollution-power-plants (last updat-
ed July 27, 2016) (“Fossil fuel-fired power plants are the largest source of U.S. CO2 
emissions.”).  In 2016, however, transportation emissions rose above those from pow-
er plants.  See Brad Plumer, Power Plants Are No Longer America’s Biggest Climate 
Problem.  Transportation Is., VOX MEDIA, 
http://www.vox.com/2016/6/13/11911798/emissions-electricity-versus-transportation 
(last updated June 13, 2016, 11:10 AM). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (“The Administrator shall prescribe regulations 
which shall establish a procedure similar to that provided by section 7410 of this title 
under which each State shall submit to the Administrator a plan which (A) establishes 
standards of performance for any existing source for any air pollutant (i) for which air 
quality criteria have not been issued or which is not included on a list published under 
section 7408(a) of this title or emitted from a source category which is regulated un-
der section 7412 of this title but (ii) to which a standard of performance under this 
section would apply if such existing source were a new source, and (B) provides for 
the implementation and enforcement of such standards of performance.  Regulations 
of the Administrator under this paragraph shall permit the State in applying a standard 
of performance to any particular source under a plan submitted under this paragraph 
to take into consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the exist-
ing source to which such standard applies.”). 
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thority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from such sources under § 
111(d).103  Yet it is not that simple, as the other amendment to § 111(d) would 
seem to allow such regulation to proceed. 
The potential statutory conflict in § 111(d) is particularly important be-
cause it implicates the EPA’s authority to enact the CPP in the first place.  
The relevant language may be subject to alternative readings, upon which the 
EPA’s legal position could be sustained (and the EPA argues as such).  But 
the EPA has also argued that, insofar as there is uncertainty as to how Con-
gress amended the relevant statutory language – and therefore a degree of 
uncertainty as to what the relevant statutory language is – the agency should 
receive Chevron deference on this point.104 
This argument for Chevron deference cannot be sustained on Chevron’s 
delegation foundation.  Congress erred in making simultaneous conflicting 
amendments to the U.S. Code.  An error is not an implicit delegation of au-
thority, and there is no basis upon which to presume that Congress would 
have intended it as such.  Indeed, such a delegation would raise serious con-
stitutional concerns – concerns far greater than those implicated by even the 
broadest Chevron delegations.105  For Congress to delegate to the EPA the 
authority to determine which amendment to the CAA is the law is for the 
legislature to delegate to the executive the power to determine what is the 
enacted law.106  If it is unconstitutional for Congress to delegate to the Execu-
tive Branch authority to excise unwanted portions of enacted legislation, it is 
difficult to see how a delegation of authority to choose which provisions that 
otherwise satisfied bicameralism and presentment are to be considered the 
law.107  Thus, whatever else the Court concludes should it consider the CPP, 
it should refrain from conferring Chevron deference to the EPA. 
 
 103. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
 104. Brief for Respondent EPA at 62, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 
(1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-1112, 14-1151, 14-1146), 2015 WL 661318, at *52 (“Where 
internal tension in a statute makes possible alternative reasonable constructions, 
Chevron dictates that a court defer to the agency’s . . . expert judgment about which 
interpretation fits best with, and makes the most sense of, the statutory scheme.” 
(quoting Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014) (plurality))). 
 105. See Sales & Adler, supra note 60, at 1539. 
 106. See Laurence H. Tribe & Peabody Energy Corp., Comment Letter on Pro-
posed Rule to Issue Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 27, 28 (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.masseygail.com/pdf/Tribe-Peabody_111(d)_Comments_(filed).pdf (“If 
EPA were permitted to choose which of the two versions of Section 111 it preferred 
to enforce, the agency would move beyond its proper role of ensuring that the law is 
faithfully executed and instead assume lawmaking power . . . . [I]f Congress had in-
deed enacted two different versions of Section 111(d) in 1990, Chevron would con-
firm in EPA a wholly extra-constitutional latitude to choose between them.”). 
 107. Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (“There is no provision in 
the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal stat-
utes.”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Chevron is the law of the land and is likely to remain a key part of ad-
ministrative law for years to come.  Although some academics and politicians 
seem ready to throw Chevron overboard, it is unlikely a majority of the Court 
feels the same way.  Accidental or not, Chevron deference will remain part of 
the administrative law firmament. 
Chevron may persist, but it should be constrained by its foundations.  As 
the Chief Justice suggested in City of Arlington, Chevron is not an excuse for 
courts to abdicate their responsibilities.  The doctrine does not give agencies 
carte blanche.  Rather, Chevron provides agencies with fulsome deference to 
their statutory interpretations when agencies are acting pursuant to, and with-
in the scope of, legislative delegation of authority.  Chevron may rule, but it 
should only do so within Chevron’s domain. 
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